ABSTRACT
Following China’s defeat after the Boxer Uprising of 1900 and the subsequent financially crippling Boxer indemnity, the ‘Powers’, determined to assist in the modernization of China, sought ways to control and finance development despite their undermining of that country’s creditworthiness. Initially the solution seemed to rest with the traditional search for concessions, a solution which, seen in the aftermath of the division of Africa, threatened China’s sovereignty and was countered not only by the national Rights Recovery movement but also by the effective opposition of local gentry. The Powers were perforce left with the opportunity of finance alone, which, to be practical, had to be (i) coordinated and (ii) exclusive. To be effective the Powers had to set up a complex of agreements and companies which would satisfy the ambitions of the several nations involved and, at the same time, control China’s
access to overseas funds. In China, however, the need to finance current expenditures was an overall priority; overseas, multi-national financial interests challenged the arrangements approved by foreign ministries; furthermore, those interests left out of the agreements and those who disagreed with their terms were free to challenge, indeed undermine, arrangements carefully worked out.2
