ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on Dieter Henrich's reasons for arguing that a certain form of metaphysical and 'speculative' thinking is indispensable even in contemporary philosophy, especially in the context of a renewal of the philosophy of the subject. These reasons had been developed by Henrich quite independent of Jürgen Habermas's arguments against a return to metaphysics and a renewed philosophy of subjectivity. The kind of metaphysics envisaged by Henrich is Kantian in spirit, and it fully accepts Immanuel Kant's critique of the rationalist metaphysical tradition. For Henrich it was Kant who inaugurated a new philosophical sensitivity and a new level of reflexivity. Henrich believes that a reconciliation of these antagonistic and irreducible tendencies and the life-plans based on them is possible. Henrich claims that final answers to the question of who we are and how we should understand our condition can only be gained through a form of speculative thinking.
