ABSTRACT
Philip Pettit has come to the aid of deliberative democrats, helping them clarify their arguments and improve their position. I am no 'genuine' deliberative democrat, so I cannot say for sure whether they will in general accept his republican solution to the discursive dilemma. Instead, I would like to explore the differences and similarities of this solution to the approach of constitutional economics. First, I will have a short look at the differences between deliberative democrats and economists in general. I am then going to discuss some advantages of constitutional economics over 'ordinary' neoclassical economics before turning to the similarities of Pettit's approach to constitutional economics. Finally, I will - despite my initial carefulness on this matter - come back to the question of whether the republican solution presented is really acceptable for deliberative democrats. I doubt this. But in any case, I am going to argue that constitutional economists can accept nearly all of this solution.
