ABSTRACT
British decision-making during the Suez crisis was the product of deliberations within three small groups with overlapping membership headed by a persistent leader: the full Cabinet, the Egypt Committee and an inner circle of Senior Ministers. Each group was constrained by domestic politics and, especially, the context of planning by the military organization. Decision-making in the Cabinet, Egypt Committee, and the inner circles was constrained by domestic politics. Centralization is likely to increase the weight of small groups and their leaders in decision-making. The exact nature of centralization of British decision-making during the Suez crisis has to be qualified, however. This chapter concludes with a comparison between Suez and the war against Iraq in 2003. In the early hours of 20 March 2003, a coalition of several countries, led by the United States, started a war against Iraq. The Challe-plan offered the possibility to occupy the Suez Canal without alienating international public opinion too much, especially the United States.
