ABSTRACT
Anti-realism, by contrast, involves a denial of this for any one of the specified fields. Realism and anti-realism, then, are metaphysical theories, and have most often been taken to concern matters of what there is. Dummett advances at least two arguments against generic realism and in support of generic anti-realism, which are better regarded as challenges to reconcile claims to which the realist is held to be committed. Hale's response amounts to the claim that Strawson's account gives no reason to accept semantic realism in preference to anti-realism, and not that semantic realism is false. A more sweeping form of anti-realism than those of Dummett or Wright or Hale has been advocated by Richard Rorty, for whom realism depends on an outmoded belief in creation. Realism is the obvious interpretation of theistic religious language, and a strong argument would be required to justify its abandonment.
