Breadcrumbs Section. Click here to navigate to respective pages.
Chapter

Chapter
Strategic Voting and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
DOI link for Strategic Voting and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
Strategic Voting and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem book
Strategic Voting and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
DOI link for Strategic Voting and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
Strategic Voting and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem book
ABSTRACT
Introduction One of the most important understandings about RBVPRs (ranking-based vote processing rules) to flow from Arrow’s work is the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. This theorem was first conjectured by William Vickrey.1 It was subsequently proved concurrently by Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite.2 While the proof of the theorem is quite complex, the theorem itself can be stated relatively simply as follows:
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: No non-dictatorial RBVPR for more than two options with a universal domain can motivate voters in all circumstances to report their rankings of the options honestly.