ABSTRACT
Advances in modern medicine have meant that that the twilight between when an individual enters a state of permanent unresponsiveness and death can be extended almost indefinitely. In circumstances where there is little likelihood of recovery, what is created is something that is after death, in practical terms, but before medical science and law agree that death has occurred. It is in this twilight world that medicine, law and community values have attempted to achieve some form of reconciliation over when it is appropriate to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. My analysis is directed to the question of causation in the context of euthanasia and the law. The moral and legal justification, or lack of justification, for the sanctioning of euthanasia by the State has received considerable attention in recent years. The debate over the passage of the Ri'ghts of the Termi'nally Ill Act 1995 (NT) in the Northern Territory and the subsequent enactment by the Commonwealth Parliament of the Euthanasi'a Laws Act 1996 (Cth), which effectively invalidated the Northern Territory legislation, is still fresh in the community's memory. It has been suggested that the introduction of
legislation similar to that in the Northern Territory is the culmination of a steady retreat from the sanctity of life ethic which has, until now, been paramount in precedent and statute.'
