ABSTRACT
Before laying out the final argument, it is good to briefly take stock of what we have been doing until now and look at the remaining issues from that angle. While the first three chapters situated the capability approach and assessed its contributions with respect to utilitarianism and Rawls’s theory, the next three expounded and examined the principles and philosophical foundations for a plausible capabilitiesfocused vision of a just society – particularly when such a vision can be construed as aiming at the greatest possible condition for the realization of basic capabilities for all. As it has emerged at different points of the discussion so far, both in their critique of other dominant theories of justice and in developing their own versions of the capability approach, the capability theorists appeal to and attach great importance to democracy and the related idea of public reasoning. This is so very true especially of Sen who in comparison to others is keen on elevating the capability approach as a public conception. For instance, it can be recollected that in order to resolve the issue of selection of the relevant capabilities for policy priorities, Sen alludes to democracy: every society through public discussion and democratic deliberation might decide on the list of basic capabilities and on the threshold of each of these
capabilities. Unlike Nussbaum or Anderson, Sen does not think that the reach and relevance of the capability approach will be minimized or make less forceful by not embracing a predetermined universal list of capabilities. Also, on the issue of which capability shortfalls of individuals have a claim on justice and social responsibility and to what extent the warranted compensation should be done without at the same time undermining agency and personal responsibility, Sen again, recommends that these are matters for public judgement and social ethos.
