ABSTRACT

Over the winter of 1916-17, the BEF digested the experience of the Somme. Two armies, nine corps, and 49 divisions had fought there for at least two weeks, and even more units had come and gone. This dwarfed the single biggest battle of 1915, which involved one army, three corps, and nine divisions. What is impressive, given the reputation of First World War generals for obstinacy, is the eager search for lessons. Very shortly after the Somme battles ended, both the Fourth and Fifth Armies compiled reports of “lessons learned” with an eye to improving training and tactics across the whole BEF.1 This led to a new batch of tactical, planning, and training pamphlets. Until mid-1918, when an Inspector-General of Training was established, these pamphlets were the product of the General Staff at GHQ. The various arms were in charge of their own detailed training, but each focused on what they needed to know in order to fit into a greater whole. There was some combined training; some infantry units practiced advancing behind an artillery barrage, as they would in combat.2 Artillery batteries learned how to improve, for instance, their accuracy, but at the same time they were told how best to use that accuracy to aid the infantry. As the BEF learned the business of trench warfare, the nature of SS pamphlets changed. not until 1916 did a comprehensive set explain the most advanced British ideas throughout the entire BEF, and many units treated these as advice rather than instructions. In 1917 and 1918 there was far more assertiveness from above, because the Somme offensive had shown the need for greater uniformity of training. Yet GHQ matched the quest for uniform training with a desire to seek new ideas (at least at the tactical level) that could then be spread across the BEF. GHQ consulted the armies for ideas, but would decide what was published. While this doubtless brought forward many new ideas, when there was disagreement, it tended to produce lowest-common-denominator results.3