ABSTRACT
Several steps have been taken which prepare the way for a reconsideration of the ancient cosmological argument for the existence of God. First, over against Logical Positivism, a case has been made for the meaningfulness of language about God. Not only have the general assumptions that underlie positivism been questioned, an attempt has been made, especially in Chapter 5, to indicate what the word ‘God’ means, notably within the context of religious narratives. Second, over and against postmodernism, a case has been made for some universal aspects of reason, in terms of which an argument can be held to support a universally true conclusion. In particular, the attack on postmodernism has suggested the way in which reason can respond to the search for some general philosophy, both through the criterion of finding a position that is internally and externally coherent, and in terms of seeking an ‘organizing idea’ of the kind that Keith Ward describes. Third, it has been argued that the universe needs to be seen as a ‘whole’, rather than as a collection of discrete events or things. Fourth, although both materialism and monism have been presented as possible candidates for a general philosophy of life, it is clear that neither is free of problems. Also, when these world-views are presented with some sensitivity to these problems, it is not certain that they are necessarily in conflict with all forms of theism. Fifth, the sense in which God can be thought of as a ‘necessary’ being has been explored, and the significance of this will be taken up shortly. Finally, the account of the concept of God given in Chapter 5 makes it clear that any demand for a ‘proof’ of the reality of God, corresponding to the way in which the word ‘proof’ is used in contexts like those of mathematics, science and law, indicates a failure to understand the concept of God. The concept of a reality that both undergirds the physical universe and transcends it could not possibly be demonstrated in a manner that is appropriate for items within the universe. What we might hope to find is (i) a demonstration of the shallowness of any philosophy that reckons to explain the richness of our experience without reference to the divine, and (ii) a demonstration of how a theistic philosophy enriches and enhances our understanding of human experience. These things can provide the rational context for faith, but there is a systematic absurdity in claiming that what religious people mean by ‘faith’ could ever be achieved simply by reflection, and without an existential dimension. Faith can, and I argue, should, avoid any acceptance of the irrational but, by its very nature, faith must go beyond the rational and involve a commitment of the person.
