ABSTRACT
This final chapter draws together the key findings of the book as a whole and seeks to summarise them in an accessible way. Its main argument is that the PA’s statebuilding plan was, in essence, a contradiction in terms. This was because the programme presented itself as a process by which a Palestinian state would be built by Palestinians themselves. By springing into life, this ‘State of Palestine’ would signify the end of a long-running conflict and the liberation of an entire population from the misery of foreign occupation. In reality, though, what happened was that the only real institutional development that took place was confined to the security forces, and it was driven by major Western powers in coordination with Israel. The remainder of ‘the state’, which comprised an admittedly inefficient social support system, was cut back. Thus, rather than achieving liberation and peace, what came out of statebuilding was a lopsided police state that was even less capable of providing even basic services to its own population.
