ABSTRACT
This chapter explores a final, loosely connected group of arguments against abstract entities that turn on the modal commitments of platonism. One of these modal commitments is the thesis that abstract entities like numbers and properties exist necessarily. The acceptability of necessary connections is a point of serious controversy in modal metaphysics. Proposed principles come in a variety of forms, differing strengths, and, depending on one's preferred modal epistemology, play different roles in the modal epistemology. According to Forrest, the significance and theoretical value of Hume's razor traces back to its role in a plausible modal epistemology. The largesse of necessary connections expansive platonism demands in accounting for the creatability and destructibility of abstracta make the modal commitments of austere platonism seem modest in comparison. The chapter examines modal objections to platonism which take issue with the alleged necessary existence of and necessary connections between abstract entities.
