ABSTRACT
In the last chapter I discussed some of the general conceptions of socialist politics to be found on the Labour left, and to some extent elsewhere, in which thfe primary objective of socialist strategic calculation is supposed to be the achievement of a left Labour government An influential critique of that objective is based on closely related conceptions of socialist politics. These general conceptions concern the unity-in-disunity of the left and the mass base for socialist politics that is supposed to be inherent in British society, and they involve a tendentious history of the Labour Party as a cautionary tale of leadership betrayal and a predominantly expressive orientation towards questions of policy. These themes are brought together into ‘strategies’ for achieving a left Labour government: the left is to be united around policies capable of mobilizing the potential electoral support for socialism that is supposed to be already present in British society. The aim is to bring about the major societal change described in Labour’s Programme, 1973 as involving ‘a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth’, and it is suggested that nothing less than such a change would be capable of resolving the social and economic problems of contemporary Britain. These strategies for a left Labour government play a major part in left-wing political discussion, although they by no means exhaust political calculation on the left. I have argued that the principal elements of these strategies and the ways in which they constrain political calculation and the
definition of socialist objectives must play a large part in the explanation of the widespread failure of the left to seriously consider policy in terms of what would be involved in putting it into effect and the political and economic conditions necessary for its successful implementation, and of the equally widespread failure to come to terms with the problems of winning support for their policies within the Labour movement and especially within the electorate.This chapter considers the consequences of rejecting the general conceptions of socialist politics particularly associated with these strategies. An obvious consequence is that if there is no general problem of the unity of ‘the left’ or ‘the movement’ and there is no pre-given majority for socialism in British social structure just waiting to be realized, then socialist politics cannot be subordinated to the one primary objective of the realization of that unity and that majority. Dissolution of that problem of unity poses instead the problems of constructing political support for particular sets of objectives, problems concerning alliances rather than the realization of some pre-given unity. To insist on left unity is to discount the political effects of manifest and often bitter disagreements over political objectives and more general principles to be found on the left.I have already referred to the example of the Lucas Aerospace combine who confronted a major obstacle that their methods and objectives were incompatible with the commitment to centralized control that characterizes the ‘left-wing’ leadership of TASS. To talk of unity in this context is to discount those differences, to treat the specific objectives of the Lucas combine as insignificant compared with the underlying commonality of interests which is supposed to unite them with some of their most implacable opponents. Or again, we might consider the tensions between socialist feminism and other positions on the left: for example, in relation to the negotiating stance of all too many unions over sex discrimination, or the prioritization of pay over other
questions of hours and working conditions, or in relation to the politics of the family of the CPAG. To discount those differences in favour of some underlying unity of the working class and its allies is effectively to trivialize the specific objectives of socialist feminism. There is no shortage of other examples. To talk of unity in the face of such differences is to discount the specific objectives and principles around which groups organize and about which they differ. But to recognize those differences and to take them seriously is to say that there is no common problem of strategy for the left as such and in general. It is to pose problems of strategy rather at the level of specifiable objectives and the available means and conditions of working towards them. Many of those objectives will differ from one group or organization to another, giving rise to significant disputes on the left that cannot be resolved except by transforming the practices or objectives of at least one of the disputing parties. Some objectives depend on legislation and some require transformations at other levels, for example, changes in the negotiating stance of unions on issues affecting the conditions of employment of women or in the organizational practices of TASS.But the dependence of some objectives on legislation raises the issue of parliamentary and electoral majorities, and this will be my main concern in this chapter. Now there is a sense in which the strategies for a left Labour government do recognize the importance of constructing parliamentary majorities. They aim to create a Labour Party committed to a programme of socialist transformation of British society as a true expression of the interests of the Labour movement and, did they but know it, of the vast majority of the British public. I have argued that these strategies involve an expressive conception of policy, a failure to consider the conditions of policy discussion inside the Labour Party and the unions or the political and economic conditions needed for the successful implementation of particular policy proposals, and an inability to come to terms with major centres of power and
influence inside the Labour movement. To reject the conceptual foundations of these strategies is to pose the problems of constructing effective support for legislation or executive action in the context of a non-expressive commitment to policy objectives. Some of these can no doubt be dealt with through pressure group politics or private members bills, but in general there are severe problems in getting parliamentary support or time on issues that do not form part of the parliamentary programme of a major party.So, although the expressive and programmatic Labour Party of the left Labour government strategies may be a romantic illusion, socialists (or anyone else) concerned with social and economic reform, with running central and local government, with managing the economy and establishing greater public control over its functioning, are still confronted with the necessity of working through the construction of electoral and parliamentary majorities. My point here is not that socialism can be achieved ‘through the ballot box alone’ (Hain, 1981, p.188) but simply that precious little will be achieved without it. To say that without invoking the pie in the sky of an electoral majority patiently awaiting the socialist call is to say that policy objectives and programmes have to be considered in terms of the problems of getting effective support in the labour movement and elsewhere from existing centres of power and bases of political organization, and of obtaining significant parliamentary and electoral support starting from present political conditions in Britain. This will involve working with some of those in the labour movement whose socialism is not that of the left, and probably with groups and organizations that would not consider themselves socialist at all. That prospect may not appeal to much of the traditional left, but failure to take seriously the problems of constructing effective political support out of existing political forces and ideologies is a guarantee of impotence.Socialists have no alternative but to be concerned with the furthering of policy objectives through government and,
therefore, with winning and sustaining electoral support. Current strategies of the Labour left are weak on both counts, and so, for rather different reasons, are those of the Labour right. This chapter examines left and right assessments of the relations between Labour and its actual or potential support, arguing that both are seriously deficient, and considers some of the issues involved in improving Labour’s electoral position. To introduce this discussion let me begin by summarizing the evidence concerning popular support for Labour and attitudes towards its stance on policy issues.
