ABSTRACT
John Locke has continuously been branded the philosopher of mere commonsense. When first published in 1690, Locke’s Essay was considered radical and controversial mainly due to its treatment of the subject of the human mind. In comparison with Locke’s contemporaries, modern readers have paid significantly less attention to Locke’s views on the nature of the mind and its relation to the body. Locke seems to allow for the existence of nominal essences of a higher order, which correspond to higher-level abstract ideas, for example, our ideas of mind and body. Locke’s nominal dualism should be differentiated from property dualism as well. The combination of Locke’s epistemic humility with his mind-body nominalism can be better understood by invoking the notion of function. The relevance of Richard Burthogge’s conceptualism to his mind-body nominalism will also be explored in relation to Colin McGinn’s and William Carroll’s references to Locke. The chapter also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in this book.
