ABSTRACT
This chapter explores John Locke’s epistemic humility both in historical and contemporary contexts. It examines the justification that he provides for this claim by comparing it with the two most prominent modern brands of epistemic humility, one of which derives from the work of Frank Ramsey, while the other is ascribed to Kant. The chapter also examines Pierre Coste’s suggestion that Locke follows Newton in regarding physical bodies as modified portions of space. It shows that Locke’s view has more significant parallels with the Ramseyan position defended by David Lewis. Interestingly, Jaegwon Kim notes some kinship between the Lockean view of nominal essence and Ramseyan functionalism in his recent introductory book on the philosophy of mind. According to Locke’s Ramseyan worldview, things-in-themselves are viewed as multi-tasking role-occupants, each performing any given role in virtue of distinct propert’. Locke’s epistemic humility is thus deeper and more symmetrical with regard to the nature of space and physical bodies than our modern commentators would suppose.
