ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that one should distinguish imagination from supposition, since the former is a “phenomenologically distinctive” state whose presence is not guaranteed by any supposition alone. It briefly sketches what talking about phenomenology amounts to in the current philosophical literature and then turns to four precisified versions of PhenC. A first precisified version of PhenC concerns phenomenology in the sense of sensory phenomenology. On a second phenomenological claim, PhenC might be further specified as contrasting suppositions with imaginings by claiming that only the latter necessarily involve experiential phenomenology. A third claim contrasts suppositions with imaginings by claiming that only the latter necessarily involve at least one of the four types of phenomenology presented beforehand in the brief taxonomical overview, namely sensory phenomenology, bodily types of phenomenology (e.g., algedonic, conative), emotional phenomenology or cognitive phenomenology. Phenomenology by itself would not be a good dimension for drawing a principled distinction between imagination and supposition.
