ABSTRACT
There are at least two imaginative views about supposition: cognitivism and imaginative primitivism. Cognitivism reduces supposition to belief-like or cognitive imagination. Imaginative primitivism rejects both grades of cognitivism and construes supposition as a sui generis type of imagination, different from both sensory and cognitive imagination. This chapter discusses that cognitivism is unsatisfactory since it leaves some features of supposition unexplained, or else confines the use of supposition to certain contexts without sufficient reason. Sensory imagination and cognitive imagination have features in common that distinguish them from supposition. First, contrary to sensory and cognitive imagination, supposition shows a channelled dynamics which prevents embroidery and blockage. Second, both sensory imagination and cognitive imagination are able to provoke emotion and make use of emotional responses in their processes. Propositionality is closely related to inferentiality. Propositional attitudes like belief are related to one another by inferential dispositions.
