ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates the major security issues between the U.S. and Japan during the Nixon-Sato talks, held on November 19-21, 1969, at their summit in Washington, DC. It examines three principal issues: Japan’s defense build-up within the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty system; the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa, and their subsequent re-entry into the islands during regional emergencies; and the free use of U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa for conventional combat operations with regard to the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and Indochina. Each security issue is based on cross-examination of U.S. and Japanese documents, including the following: the briefing books provided to Nixon by the National Security Council (NSC) staff and the State Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)’s briefing papers to Sato, transcripts of Nixon-Sato talks, the joint communiqué, Sato’s Press Club speech, Undersecretary Johnson’s press briefings, and the reassessment of U.S.–Japan confidential agreements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Second, this chapter examines how U.S. and Japanese leaders, respectively, assessed the implications of the November 1969 summit. This includes Nixon’s briefing meetings with cabinet members, Congressional leaders, and other Asian states (especially South Korean and Taiwanese officials), as well as Sato’s discussions with MOFA officials and his political campaign during the December 1969 Lower House Election. Finally, this chapter briefly discusses U.S.–Japan negotiations and the implementation of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty (January 1970-May 1972). This includes the treatment of the Senkaku Islands, as well as the question of completing the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa at the time of reversion.
