The U.S.–Japan defense cooperation

This chapter discusses major events and issues in U.S.–Japan security relations from the mid-to late 1970s. First, it examines the National Security Council (NSC) interdepartmental process during the presidency of Gerald R. Ford (August 1974-January 1977), including the National Security Study Memorandum 210 (NSSM210) paper, which was designed to promote greater burdensharing in U.S.–Japan security arrangements. In particular, this chapter explores how, while presidential authority declined, caused by the collapse of U.S. policy in Indochina (namely, the April 1975 fall of Saigon), Secretary Kissinger sought to preserve the diplomatic leverage held by the U.S. in U.S.–Soviet-China-Japan interactions. This chapter also discusses how the Japanese and U.S. governments reaffirmed their secret agreements and disagreements regarding the controversial question of U.S. transit rights of nuclear weapons into Japan, which had the potential to seriously damage the foundation of the U.S.–Japan defense cooperation. Further, the chapter examines how the Japan Defense Agency, led by Director-General Michita Sakata and Administrative Vice-Minister Takuya Kubo, responded to the relative decline of U.S. military power in the altering security environment in East Asia by institutionalizing the concept of Fundamental Defense Capability, leading to the October 1976 Japanese National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). Additionally, this chapter assesses the negotiating process as well as the long-term political-military implications of the November 1978 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation. In essence, the U.S. sought to expand U.S.–Japan defense cooperation to address East Asian regional security. Japan principally focused on the defense of its homeland. However, Japan’s intentional ambiguity left room for its possible involvement in regional security, should circumstances demand it.