ABSTRACT
This chapter provides brief account of the Carvakan position to make two points. The points are: those theories about what constitutes the self arise from more general theories about the nature of reality and that the philosophy persons of India contain a number of different and even incompatible theories about the self. The chapter suggest that Carvakas were sceptical about powers of rational argumentation and that they were particularly concerned to point out the difficulties facing inferential reasoning. It suggest that Carvakas, such as Jayarasi, advocated systematic philosophical scepticism about all claims that are not directly based on our experience, and they combined this with the belief that the material world that we can experience is the sum total of what really exists. The philosophies that flourished on the Indian subcontinent characteristically drew a firm distinction between the true self and the self that—prior to our liberation from rebirth— routinely take to be the subject of lives.
