ABSTRACT
One of the more significant implications of the distinction between welfare and worth, between what makes a life good for the one who lives it and what makes a life worth living, is that it helps subvert one of the chief sources of support for the general theory of moral value called welfarism. Welfarism takes three general forms: a theory of the good, a theory of the right, and a theory of rationality. This chapter focuses on a combination of the first two. The most important form of welfarism is as a theory of the morally relevant good, not the good simpliciter. To see the difference, consider these two positions: Welfarism about the Good (WG): The only intrinsic good is welfare. Welfarism about the Morally Relevant Good (WMRG): The only morally relevant good is welfare. Hedonism and objective list theories (OLT) of welfare have to admit of other forms of intrinsic value in addition to just welfare.
