ABSTRACT
A l t h o u g h Lord Morley wrote with dogmatic finality the words we have just quoted, matters did not take this shape quite as automatically as the author of the Life of Gladstone seems to suggest. As we have already said, Queen Victoria was strongly opposed to the retirement of the British troops from the Sudan. Lord Wolseley shared his Sovereign’s point of view ; but he was too much of a soldier to thrust his opinions upon the Cabinet. He gave expression to them because the Secretary for War telegraphed him on 13th April as follows :—
“ In the condition of Imperial affairs it is probable that the expedition to Khartum may have to be abandoned, and the troops brought back as soon as possible to Egypt. Consider at once what measures should, in that case, be promptly taken for safe withdrawal of troops. This would involve stopping advance from Suakin but not hurried withdrawal.” 1
This was obviously an invitation for an expression of opinion, at all events, in regard to the strategic position that should be taken by the English forces after the abandonment of the expedition to Khartum ; and it was in this sense that Lord Wolseley construed it. He cabled the next day that in the event of the Government determining to withdraw the troops he must know whether it was intended to retain Dongola, Wady Haifa, Korosko, or Asswan as the frontier post. He added that if the position on the southern frontier of Egypt was to be exclusively one of defence, he would hold Wady Haifa and Korosko as outposts with a strong brigade at Asswan.
