ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs and government partisanship on investor perceptions of governments in the developing world. It runs a feasible generalized least square (FGLS) model using a difference-in-differences design to analyze the sovereign credit ratings of developing countries. In the sovereign debt market, as in many other markets, political events have a significant impact on the profitability of private investment. Investors may retain their investment in a country under an IMF program because they believe that the IMF is, in effect, insuring that investment. The chapter summarizes the effects of IMF program participation and government partisanship on credibility. The IMF programs have differential effects on the credibility of different types of governments in a manner consistent with the "Nixon-Goes-to-China" hypothesis. Signing an IMF program is positively associated with the credit ratings of left-wing governments, whereas it is negatively associated with the ratings of right-leaning governments.
