ABSTRACT
This chapter describes the background to, and the main themes of, John McDowell’s investigation of a Davidsonian “truth theory” of meaning. Such a theory of meaning aims to articulate the structure of natural language by drawing on the logical machinery of Tarski’s semantic conception of truth. The chapter suggests that while McDowell thus places the best possible interpretation on the role of Davidsonian theories, in so doing he undermines their value as theories of meaning in any reputable philosophical endeavour. It explains Donald Davidson’s influential approach to the philosophy of language. The chapter outlines McDowell’s discussion of both the formal structure and the implicit background constraints imposed on it by radical interpretation. It considers the kind of insight that such a formal theory of meaning is supposed to give by examining the relation of truth and meaning. The chapter assesses McDowell’s suggestion that an austere Davidsonian theory can sustain a distinction between sense and reference.
