ABSTRACT
Panellists are the most important group in deciding whether a project proposal passes the evaluation process. This chapter describes the actors and rules of the European Research Council's (ERC) evaluation process, followed by a conceptual comparison with those of similar organizations at national level: The American, German and French ones. The investigations of the panel system explain three interrelated social mechanisms operative in it: Its unanimity decision rule is analysed, as well as the social function of reputation for reducing uncertainty, and how role accumulation among panellists contributes to oligarchization in evaluation outcomes. The concurrence of these three mechanisms feed back a process of cumulative advantage and disadvantage, resulting in a Matthew Effect in distributing symbolic reputation. Conclusions highlight the fundamental role of peer review for the cultural legitimacy of the ERC acting as an intermediary organization 'by scientists for scientists' that represents the collective self-regulation and intellectual autonomy of science vis-a-vis political actors, such as the European Commission.
