ABSTRACT
The boundary between estoppel by representation and contract is marked by the foundational distinction between representation and promise. In traditional analysis, a representation is a statement of past or present fact and a promise is a statement of future action. Courts normally do not allow promissory statements to raise an estoppel; this is to prevent circumvention of the underlying policy that promises do not bind absent a formed contract. The first modern case of contractual estoppel is the Court of Appeal decision in Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. This was a case of a mis-sold investment product. The court formulated the principle of contractual estoppel and applied it to conclude that the claimant was estopped by the terms of the contract from showing inducement by the misdescription. The principle of contractual estoppel was authoritatively formulated in general terms in the leading case of JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corporation.
