ABSTRACT
Our topics are consciousness, its properties, what neuroscience has to say about them, and whether what neuroscience has to say about them is enough to warrant reducing conscious properties and events to neural assemblies, their activities and their properties. A psychological state, process, or event is conscious in the full sense of the term whenever it is intentionally structured, qualitatively endowed and subjectively perspectival or, more pedantically, whenever it has the properties of being intentionally structured, qualitatively endowed and subjectively perspectival. As so understood, a conscious event is complex, for it is a set of properties instantiated by a psychological event, state or process. Since it is a set of properties that are instantiated when a psychological event, state or process is conscious, any such event, state or process that has deficits to one or more of these properties is compromised. Neuroscience confirms the existence of compromised conscious events, states and processes.
