ABSTRACT
The primary US policy tool for countering subsidies is countervailing duty law. Countervailing duty cases are initiated less frequently than antidumping actions and in addition to being less frequent, they are generally directed at imports from a diverse group of countries—different, in many cases, from the countries that are targets of antidumping actions. There are several reasons for this difference. First, the leading target of antidumping actions is China. Second, two other prominent targets of antidumping complaints—Japan and Korea—appear much less frequently as targets of countervailing duty investigations. Broadening the definition of a subsidy to cover upstream subsidies can make countervailing duties more relevant, but they are still an imperfect tool. The most obvious alternate approach potentially available under US law is to impose countervailing subsidies on domestic production to offset the effect of foreign subsidies. The United States has used its broadest trade law—Section 301—in efforts to counter subsidies.
