To what extent, and in what contexts, are human decisions appropriately assumed to be shaped by the actor's rational calculation of self-interest? This question and its corollaries underlie many disputed points not only in contemporary social theory but in contemporary legal theory as well. In particular, much work in rational choice theory and in the law-and-economics movement presupposes that people make decisions in a rationally calculative way in pursuit of self-interest, a presupposition that varies in strength and specificity among authors. Amitai Etzioni has explored the limits of this presupposition across his career, most fully in The Moral Dimension. Where law-and-economics theorists assume that people endeavor to maximize utility, Etzioni argues that "utility" means not only the pursuit of pleasure but also adherence to moral codes. Where many law-and-economics theorists assume that people attempt to act in strictly rational fashion, Etzioni argues that people select both means and goals within a context of values and norms such that the effectiveness of their actions is enhanced. And where law-and-economics theorists assume the individual to be the decision-making unit, Etzioni argues that relationships between people frame individuals' decisions.1