Rectification and “Verdict Reversal” during the Crisis Years, 1960–1962

As awareness of the full extent of the economic disaster resulting from the Great Leap Forward took hold in 1960, China’s leaders embarked on a course which went far beyond a normal consolidation of gains and became a headlong retreat from the official policies of the previous years. Most analyses of this period have pictured a growing divergence between Mao, now allegedly shunted to the background, and a dominant group of Politburo leaders who mapped out a pragmatic program of policy adjustments. ¹ This interpretation, in contrast, sees a fragile and limited consensus reestablished by 1961 on the unavoidable need for drastic measures to cope with the unprecedented crisis. While the Chairman did finally retire to the “second line,” this was a voluntary move in a context where he was increasingly preoccupied with Sino-Soviet relations and had no systematic cure for China’s domestic ills himself, and in any case where he specifically endorsed the major “revisionist” policy changes during the first two stages of the retreat up to January 1961. ² However, by mid-1962 Mao felt the third stage of the retreat had gone too far and ordered a series of measures to protect the collective sector and restore orthodox controls.