Epilogue

In our age, which has seen the fruits of the French Revolution-“Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité”—growing into a broad social move ment whose aim is not merely to raise or lower polit ical rights to the same general level, but, more hope fully, to abolish unhap pi ness alto gether by means of external regu la tions and egal it arian reforms-in such an age it is indeed a thank less task to speak of the complete inequal ity of the elements compos ing a nation. Although it is certainly a fine thing that every man should stand equal before the law, that every man should have his polit ical vote, and that no man, through hered it ary social posi tion and priv ilege, should have unjust advant age over his brother, it is distinctly less fine when the idea of equal ity is exten ded to other walks of life. A man must have a very clouded vision, or view human society from a very misty distance, to cherish the notion that the uniform regu la tion of life would auto mat ic ally ensure a uniform distribu tion of happi ness. He must be pretty far gone in delu sion if he imagines that equal ity of income, or equal oppor tun it ies for all, would have approxim ately the same value for every one. But, if he were a legis lator, what would he do about all those people whose greatest oppor tun it ies lie not without, but within? If he were just, he would have to give at least twice as much money to the one man as to the other, since to the one it means much, to the other little. No social legis la tion will ever be able to over come the

there fore, to speak of the hetero gen eity of men. These differ ences involve such differ ent require ments for happi ness that no legis la tion, however perfect, could afford them even approx im ate satis fac tion. No outward form of life could be devised, however equit able and just it might appear, that would not involve injustice for one or the other human type. That, in spite of this, every kind of enthu si ast-polit ical, social, philo soph ical, or reli gious-is busily endeav our ing to find those uniform external condi tions which would bring with them greater oppor tun it ies for the happi ness of all seems to me connec ted with a general atti tude to life too exclus ively oriented by the outer world. It is not possible to do more than touch on this far-reach ing ques tion

here, since such consid er a tions lie outside the scope of this book. We are here concerned only with the psycho lo gical problem, and the exist ence of differ ent typical atti tudes is a problem of the first order, not only for psycho logy but for all depart ments of science and life in which man’s psycho logy plays a decis ive role. It is, for instance, obvious to anyone of ordin ary intelli gence that every philo sophy that is not just a history of philo sophy depends on a personal psycho lo gical premise. This premise may be of a purely individual nature, and indeed is gener ally regarded as such if any psycho lo gical criti cism is made at all. The matter is then considered settled. But this is to over look the fact that what one regards as an indi vidual preju dice is by no means so under all circum stances, since the stand point of a partic u lar philosopher often has a consid er able follow ing. It is accept able to his follow ers not because they echo him without think ing, but because it is some thing they can fully under stand and appre ci ate. Such an under stand ing would be impossible if the philo sopher’s stand point were determ ined only indi vidually, for it is quite certain in that case that he would be neither fully understood nor even toler ated. The pecu li ar ity of the stand point which is under stood and acknow ledged by his follow ers must there fore corres pond to a typical personal atti tude, which in the same or a similar form has many repres ent at ives in a society. As a rule, the partis ans of either side attack each other purely extern ally, always seeking out the chinks in their oppon ent’s armour. Squabbles of this kind are usually fruit less. It would be of consid erably greater value if the dispute were trans ferred to the psycho lo gical realm, from which it arose in the first place. The shift of posi tion would soon show a diversity of psycho lo gical atti tudes, each with its own right to exist ence, tis fies

the modest demands of shallow minds that have never yet been enkindled by the passion of a prin ciple. A real under stand ing can, in my view, be reached only when the diversity of psycho lo gical premises is accep ted. It is a fact, which is constantly and over whelm ingly appar ent in my prac-

tical work, that people are virtu ally incap able of under stand ing and accept ing any point of view other than their own. In small things a general super fi cial ity of outlook, combined with a none too common forbear ance and tolerance and an equally rare good will, may help to build a bridge over the chasm which lack of under stand ing opens between man and man. But in more import ant matters, and espe cially those concerned with ideals, an understand ing seems, as a rule, to be beyond the bounds of possib il ity. Certainly strife and misun der stand ing will always be among the props of the tragicom edy of human exist ence, but it is none the less undeni able that the advance of civil iz a tion has led from the law of the jungle to the estab lishment of courts of justice and stand ards of right and wrong which are above the contend ing parties. It is my convic tion that a basis for the settle ment of conflict ing views would be found in the recog ni tion of differ ent types of atti tude-a recog ni tion not only of the exist ence of such types, but also of the fact that every man is so imprisoned in his type that he is simply incap able of fully under stand ing another stand point. Failing a recog ni tion of this exact ing demand, a viol a tion of the other stand point is prac tic ally inevit able. But just as the contend ing parties in a court of law refrain from direct viol ence and submit their claims to the justice of the law and the impar ti al ity of the judge, so each type, conscious of his own parti al ity, should refrain from heaping abuse, suspi cion, and indig nity upon his oppon ent. In consid er ing the problem of typical atti tudes, and in present ing them in

outline, I have endeav oured to direct the eye of my readers to this picture of the many possible ways of viewing life, in the hope that I may have contributed my small share to the know ledge of the almost infin ite vari ations and grad a tions of indi vidual psycho logy. No one, I trust, will draw the conclusion from my descrip tion of types that I believe the four or eight types here presen ted to be the only ones that exist. This would be a serious miscon ception, for I have no doubt whatever that these atti tudes could also be considered and clas si fied from other points of view. Indeed, there are indica tions of such possib il it ies in this book, as for instance Jordan’s clas si fic a tion in terms of activ ity. But whatever the criterion for a clas si fic a tion of types

However easy it may be to regard the exist ing atti tudes from other viewpoints than the one here adopted, it would be diffi cult to adduce evid ence against the exist ence of psycho lo gical types. I have no doubt at all that my oppon ents will be at some pains to strike the ques tion of types off the scientific agenda, since the type problem must, to say the least of it, be a very unwel come obstacle for every theory of complex psychic processes that lays claim to general valid ity. Every theory of complex psychic processes presup poses a uniform human psycho logy, just as scientific theor ies in general presup pose that nature is funda ment ally one and the same. But in the case of psycho logy there is the pecu liar condi tion that, in the making of its theor ies, the psychic process is not merely an object but at the same time the subject. Now if one assumes that the subject is the same in all indi vidual cases, it can also be assumed that the subject ive process of theory-making, too, is the same every where. That this is not so, however, is demon strated most impress ively by the exist ence of the most diverse theor ies about the nature of complex psychic processes. Naturally, every new theory is ready to assume that all other theor ies were wrong, usually for the sole reason that its author has a differ ent subject ive view from his prede cessors. He does not realize that the psycho logy he sees is his psycho logy, and on top of that is the psycho logy of his type. He there fore supposes that there can be only one true explan a tion of the psychic process he is invest ig at ing, namely the one that agrees with his type. All other views-I might almost say all seven other views-which, in their way, are just as true as his, are for him mere aber rations. In the interests of the valid ity of his own theory, there fore, he will feel a lively but very under stand able distaste for any view that estab lishes the exist ence of differ ent types of human psycho logy, since his own view would then lose, shall we say, seven-eighths of its truth. For, besides his own theory, he would have to regard seven other theor ies of the same process as equally true, or, if that is saying too much, at least grant a second theory a value equal to his own. I am quite convinced that a natural process which is very largely inde-

pend ent of human psycho logy, and can there fore be viewed only as an object, can have but one true explan a tion. But I am equally convinced that the explan a tion of a complex psychic process which cannot be object ively registered by any appar atus must neces sar ily be only the one which that subject ive process itself produces. In other words, the author of the concept

to be explained coin cides with the process occur ring in the author himself. If neither the process to be explained, nor any analogy of it, were to be found in the author, he would be confron ted with a complete enigma, whose explan a tion he would have to leave to the man who himself exper ienced the process. If I have a vision, for instance, no object ively regis ter ing appar atus will enable me to discover how it origin ated; I can explain its origin only as I myself under stand it. But in this “as I myself under stand it” lies the parti al ity, for at best my explan a tion will start from the way the vision ary process presents itself to me. By what right do I assume that the vision ary process presents itself in the same or a similar way to every one? With some show of reason, one will adduce the uniform ity of human

psycho logy at all times and places as an argu ment in favour of this gener aliz a tion of a subject ive judg ment. I myself am so profoundly convinced of the uniform ity of the psyche that I have even summed it up in the concept of the collect ive uncon scious, as a univer sal and homo gen eous substratum whose uniform ity is such that one finds the same myth and fairytale motifs in all corners of the earth, with the result that an uneducated American Negro dreams of motifs from Greek myth o logy1 and a Swiss clerk re-experi ences in his psychosis the vision of an Egyptian Gnostic.2 But this fundamental homo gen eity is offset by an equally great hetero gen eity of the conscious psyche. What immeas ur able distances lie between the consciousness of a prim it ive, a Periclean Athenian, and a modern European! What a differ ence even between the conscious ness of a learned professor and that of his spouse! What, in any case, would our world be like if there existed a uniform ity of minds? No, the notion of a uniform ity of the conscious psyche is an academic chimera, doubt less simpli fy ing the task of a university lecturer when facing his pupils, but collapsing into nothing in the face of reality. Quite apart from the differ ences among indi vidu als whose innermost natures are separ ated by stellar distances, the types, as classes of individu als, are them selves to a very large extent differ ent from one another, and it is to the exist ence of these types that we must ascribe the differ ences of views in general. In order to discover the uniform ity of the human psyche, I have to

descend into the very found a tions of conscious ness. Only there do I find that in which all are alike. If I build my theory on what is common to all, I

explain the psyche in terms of its found a tion and origin. But that does nothing to explain its histor ical and indi vidual differ en ti ation. With such a theory I ignore the pecu li ar it ies of the conscious psyche. I actu ally deny the whole other side of the psyche, its differ en ti ation from the original germinal state. I reduce man to his phylo gen etic proto type, or I dissolve him into his element ary processes; and when I try to recon struct him again, in the former case an ape will emerge, and in the latter a welter of element ary processes engaged in aimless and mean ing less recip rocal activ ity. No doubt an explan a tion of the psyche on the basis of its uniform ity is not

only possible but fully justi fied. But if I want to project a picture of the psyche in its total ity, I must bear in mind the diversity of psyches, since the conscious indi vidual psyche belongs just as much to a general picture of psycho logy as does its uncon scious found a tion. In my construc tion of theor ies, there fore, I can, with as much right, proceed from the fact of differ en ti ated psyches, and consider the same process from the stand point of differ en ti ation which I considered before from the stand point of uniform ity. This natur ally leads me to a view diamet ric ally opposed to the former one. Everything which in that view was left out of the picture as an indi vidual variant now becomes import ant as a start ing-point for further differ en ti ations; and everything which previ ously had a special value on account of its uniform ity now appears value less, because merely collect ive. From this angle I shall always be intent on where a thing is going to, not where it comes from; whereas from the former angle I never bothered about the goal but only about the origin. I can, there fore, explain the same psychic process with two contra dict ory and mutually exclus ive theor ies, neither of which I can declare to be wrong, since the right ness of one is proved by the uniform ity of the psyche, and the right ness of the other by its diversity. This brings us to the great diffi culty which the reading of my earlier

book3 only aggrav ated, both for the scientific public and for the layman, with the result that many other wise compet ent heads were thrown into confu sion. There I made an attempt to present both views with the help of case mater ial. But since reality neither consists of theor ies nor follows them, the two views, which we are bound to think of as divided, are united within it. Each is a product of the past and carries a future meaning, and of neither can it be said with certainty whether it is an end or a begin ning. Everything that is alive in the psyche shim mers in rainbow hues. For anyone who thinks

there is only one true explan a tion of a psychic process, this vital ity of psychic contents, which neces sit ates two contra dict ory theor ies, is a matter for despair, espe cially if he is enam oured of simple and uncom plic ated truths, incap able maybe of think ing both at the same time. On the other hand, I am not convinced that, with these two ways of

looking at the psyche-the reduct ive and construct ive as I have called them4-the possib il it ies of explan a tion are exhausted. I believe that other equally “true” explan a tions of the psychic process can still be put forward, just as many in fact as there are types. Moreover, these explan a tions will agree as well or as ill with one another as the types them selves in their personal rela tions. Should, there fore, the exist ence of typical differ ences of human psyches be granted-and I confess I see no reason why it should not be granted-the scientific theor ist is confron ted with the disagree able dilemma of either allow ing several contra dict ory theor ies of the same process to exist side by side, or of making an attempt, fore-doomed at the outset, to found a sect which claims for itself the only correct method and the only true theory. Not only does the former possib il ity encounter the extraordin ary diffi culty of an inwardly contra dict ory “double-think” oper a tion, it also contra venes one of the first prin ciples of intel lec tual moral ity: prin cipia explic andi non sunt multi plic anda praeter neces sit atem.5 But in the case of psycho lo gical theor ies the neces sity of a plur al ity of explan a tions is given from the start, since, in contrast to any other scientific theory, the object of psycho lo gical explan ation is consub stan tial with the subject: one psycho lo gical process has to explain another. This serious diffi culty has already driven thought ful persons to remark able subter fuges, such as the assump tion of an “object ive intel lect” stand ing outside the psychic process and capable of contem plat ing the subor din ate psyche object ively, or the similar assump tion that the intel lect is a faculty which can stand outside itself and contem plate itself. All these expedi ents are supposed to create a sort of extra-terrestrial Archimedean point by means of which the intel lect can lift itself off its own hinges. I under stand very well the profound human need for conveni ent solu tions, but I do not see why truth should bow to this need. I can also under stand that, aesthet ic ally, it would be far more satis fact ory if, instead of the paradox of mutu ally contra dict ory explan a tions, we could reduce the psychic process

to the simplest possible instinct ive found a tion and leave it at that, or if we could credit it with a meta phys ical goal of redemp tion and find peace in that hope. Whatever we strive to fathom with our intel lect will end in paradox and

relativ ity, if it be honest work and not a petitio prin cipii in the interests of conveni ence. That an intel lec tual under stand ing of the psychic process must end in paradox and relativ ity is simply unavoid able, if only for the reason that the intel lect is but one of many psychic func tions which is inten ded by nature to serve man in construct ing of his images of the object ive world. We should not pretend to under stand the world only by the intel lect; we apprehend it just as much by feeling. Therefore the judg ment of the intel lect is, at best, only a half-truth, and must, if it is honest, also admit its inad equacy. To deny the exist ence of types is of little avail in the face of the facts. In

view of their exist ence, there fore, every theory of psychic processes has to submit to being eval u ated in its turn as itself a psychic process, as the expression of a specific type of human psycho logy with its own justi fic a tion. Only from these typical self-repres ent a tions of the psyche can the mater i als be collec ted which will co-operate to form a higher synthesis.