ABSTRACT
From ancient times there have been numer ous attempts to reduce the manifold differ ences between human indi vidu als to defin ite categor ies, and on the other hand to break down the appar ent uniform ity of mankind by a sharper char ac ter iz a tion of certain typical differ ences. Without wishing to go too deeply into the history of these attempts, I would like to call attention to the fact that the oldest categor ies known to us origin ated with physi cians. Of these perhaps the most import ant was Claudius Galen, the Greek phys i cian who lived in the second century A.D. He distin guished four basic tempera ments: the sanguine, the phleg matic, the choleric, and the melancholic. The under ly ing idea goes back to the fifth century B.C., to the teachings of Hippocrates, that the human body was composed of the four elements, air, water, fire, and earth. Corresponding to these elements, four substances were to be found in the living body, blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile; and it was Galen’s idea that, by the varying admix ture of
these four substances, men could be divided into four classes. Those in whom there was a prepon der ance of blood belonged to the sanguine type; a prepon der ance of phlegm produced the phleg matic; yellow bile produced the choleric, and black bile the melan cholic. As our language shows, these differ ences of tempera ment have passed into history, though they have, of course, long since been super seded as a physiolo gical theory. To Galen undoubtedly belongs the credit for having created a psycho lo gical
clas si fic a tion of human beings which has endured for two thou sand years, a clas si fic a tion based on percept ible differ ences of emotion al ity or affectiv ity. It is inter est ing to note that the first attempt at a typo logy was concerned with the emotional beha viour of man-obvi ously because affectiv ity is the common est and most strik ing feature of beha viour in general. Affects, however, are by no means the only distin guish ing mark of the
human psyche. Characteristic data can be expec ted from other psycho l - ogical phenom ena as well, the only require ment being that we perceive and observe other func tions as clearly as we do affects. In earlier centur ies, when the concept “psycho logy” as we know it today was entirely lacking, all psychic func tions other than affects were veiled in dark ness, just as they still seem to be scarcely discern ible subtleties for the great major ity of people today. Affects can be seen on the surface, and that is enough for the unpsycho lo gical man-the man for whom the psyche of his neigh bour presents no problem. He is satis fied with seeing other people’s affects; if he sees none, then the other person is psycho lo gic ally invis ible to him because, apart from affects, he can perceive nothing in the other’s conscious ness. The reason why we are able to discover other func tions besides affects
in the psyche of our fellow men is that we ourselves have passed from an “unprob lem at ical” state of conscious ness to a prob lem at ical one. If we judge others only by affects, we show that our chief, and perhaps only, criterion is affect. This means that the same criterion is also applic able to our own psycho logy, which amounts to saying that our psycho lo gical judgment is neither object ive nor inde pend ent but is enslaved to affect. This truth holds good for the major ity of men, and on it rests the psycho lo gical possib il ity of murder ous wars and the constant threat of their recur rence. This must always be so as long as we judge the people “on the other side” by our own affects. I call such a state of conscious ness “unprob lem at ical” because it has obvi ously never become a problem to itself. It becomes
always inclined to justify ourselves before anyone who holds us respons ible for an emotional action by saying that we acted only on an outburst of affect and are not usually in that condi tion. When it concerns ourselves we are glad to explain the affect as an excep tional condi tion of dimin ished responsib il ity but are loath to make the same allow ance for others. Even if this is a not very edify ing attempt to exculp ate our beloved ego, there is still something posit ive in the feeling of justi fic a tion such an excuse affords: it is an attempt to distin guish oneself from one’s own affect, and hence one’s fellow man from his affect. Even if my excuse is only a subter fuge, it is never the less an attempt to cast doubt on the valid ity of affect as the sole index of person al ity, and to appeal to other psychic func tions that are just as char ac ter istic of it as the affect, if not more so. When a man judges us by our affects, we readily accuse him of lack of under stand ing, or even injustice. But this puts us under an oblig a tion not to judge others by their affects either. For this purpose the prim it ive, unpsy cho lo gical man, who regards
affects in himself and others as the only essen tial criterion, must develop a prob lem at ical state of conscious ness in which other factors besides affects are recog nized as valid. In this prob lem at ical state a para dox ical judg ment can be formed: “I am this affect” and “this affect is not me.” This anti thesis expresses a split ting of the ego, or rather, a split ting of the psychic mater ial that consti tutes the ego. By recog niz ing myself as much in my affect as in some thing else that is not my affect, I differ en ti ate an affect ive factor from other psychic factors, and in so doing I bring the affect down from its original heights of unlim ited power into its proper place in the hier archy of psychic func tions. Only when a man has performed this oper a tion on himself, and has distin guished between the various psychic factors in himself, is he in a posi tion to look around for other criteria in his psycho l - o gical judg ment of others, instead of merely falling back on affect. Only in this way is a really object ive psycho lo gical judg ment possible. What we call “psycho logy” today is a science that can be pursued only on
the basis of certain histor ical and moral premises laid down by Christian educa tion during the last two thou sand years. A saying like “Judge not, that ye be not judged,” incul cated by reli gion, has created the possib il ity of a will which strives, in the last resort, for simple objectiv ity of judg ment. This objectiv ity, imply ing no mere indif fer ence to others but based on the prin-
on this ques tion of objectiv ity, but you would cease to wonder if ever you should try to clas sify people in prac tice. A man of pronounced sanguine tempera ment will tell you that at bottom he is deeply melan cholic; a choleric, that his only fault consists in his having always been too phlegmatic. But a clas si fic a tion in the valid ity of which I alone believe is about as helpful as a univer sal church of which I am the sole member. We have, there fore, to find criteria which can be accep ted as binding not only by the judging subject but also by the judged object. In complete contrast to the old system of clas si fic a tion by tempera ments,
the new typo logy begins with the expli cit agree ment neither to allow oneself to be judged by affect nor to judge others by it, since no one can declare himself finally identical with his affect. This creates a problem, because it follows that, where affects are concerned, the general agree ment which science demands can never be reached. We must, there fore, look around for other factors as a criterion-factors to which we appeal when we excuse ourselves for an emotional action. We say perhaps: “Admittedly I said this or that in a state of affect, but of course I was exag ger at ing and no harm was meant.” A very naughty child who has caused his mother a lot of trouble might say: “I didn’t mean to, I didn’t want to hurt you, I love you too much.” Such explan a tions appeal to the exist ence of a differ ent kind of person-
al ity from the one that appeared in the affect. In both cases the affect ive person al ity appears as some thing inferior that seized hold of the real ego and obscured it. But often the person al ity revealed in the affect is a higher and better one, so much so that, regret tably, one cannot remain on such a pinnacle of perfec tion. We all know those sudden fits of gener os ity, altru ism, self-sacri fice, and similar “beau ti ful gestures” for which, as an iron ical observer might remark, one does not care to be held respons ible-perhaps a reason why so many people do so little good. But whether the affect ive person al ity be high or low, the affect is
considered an excep tional state whose qual it ies are repres en ted either as a falsi fic a tion of the “real” person al ity or as not belong ing to it as an authen tic attrib ute. What then is this “real” person al ity? Obviously, it is partly that which every one distin guishes in himself as separ ate from affect, and partly that in every one which is dismissed as inau thentic in the judg ment of others. Since it is impossible to deny the pertin ence of the affect ive state to en tial
atti tude to these psycho lo gical happen ings. In the affect ive state it is unfree, driven, coerced. By contrast, the normal state is a state of free will, with all one’s powers at one’s disposal. In other words, the affect ive state is unprob lem at ical, while the normal state is prob lem at ical: it comprises both the problem and possib il ity of free choice. In this latter state an under stand ing becomes possible, because in it alone can one discern one’s motives and gain self-know ledge. Discrimination is the sine qua non of cogni tion. But discrim in a tion means split ting up the contents of conscious ness into discrete func tions. Therefore, if we wish to define the psycho lo gical pecu li ar ity of a man in terms that will satisfy not only our own subject ive judg ment but also the object judged, we must take as our criterion that state or atti tude which is felt by the object to be the conscious, normal condi tion. Accordingly, we shall make his conscious motives our first concern, while elim in at ing as far as possible our own arbit rary inter pret a tions. Proceeding thus we shall discover, after a time, that in spite of the great
variety of conscious motives and tend en cies, certain groups of indi vidu als can be distin guished who are char ac ter ized by a strik ing conform ity of motiv a tion. For example, we shall come upon indi vidu als who in all their judg ments, percep tions, feel ings, affects, and actions feel external factors to be the predom in ant motiv at ing force, or who at least give weight to them no matter whether causal or final motives are in ques tion. I will give some examples of what I mean. St. Augustine: “I would not believe the Gospel if the author ity of the Catholic Church did not compel it.”2 A dutiful daugh ter: “I could not allow myself to think anything that would be displeas ing to my father.” One man finds a piece of modern music beau ti ful because everybody else pretends it is beau ti ful. Another marries in order to please his parents but very much against his own interests. There are people who contrive to make them selves ridicu lous in order to amuse others; they even prefer to make butts of them selves rather than remain unnoticed. There are not a few who in everything they do or don’t do have but one motive in mind: what will others think of them? “One need not be ashamed of a thing if nobody knows about it.” There are some who can find happi ness only when it excites the envy of others; some who make trouble for them selves in order to enjoy the sympathy of their friends. Such examples could be multi plied indefi n itely. They point to a psycho l -
o gical pecu li ar ity that can be sharply distin guished from another atti tude
which, by contrast, is motiv ated chiefly by internal or subject ive factors. A person of this type might say: “I know I could give my father the greatest pleas ure if I did so and so, but I don’t happen to think that way.” Or: “I see that the weather has turned out bad, but in spite of it I shall carry out my plan.” This type does not travel for pleas ure but to execute a precon ceived idea. Or: “My book is prob ably incom pre hens ible, but it is perfectly clear to me.” Or, going to the other extreme: “Everybody thinks I could do something, but I know perfectly well I can do nothing.” Such a man can be so ashamed of himself that he liter ally dares not meet people. There are some who feel happy only when they are quite sure nobody knows about it, and to them a thing is disagree able just because it is pleas ing to every one else. They seek the good where no one would think of finding it. At every step the sanc tion of the subject must be obtained, and without it nothing can be under taken or carried out. Such a person would have replied to St. Augustine: “I would believe the Gospel if the author ity of the Catholic Church did not compel it.” Always he has to prove that everything he does rests on his own decisions and convic tions, and never because he is influ enced by anyone, or desires to please or concili ate some person or opinion. This atti tude char ac ter izes a group of indi vidu als whose motiv a tions are
derived chiefly from the subject, from inner neces sity. There is, finally, a third group, and here it is hard to say whether the motiv a tion comes chiefly from within or without. This group is the most numer ous and includes the less differ en ti ated normal man, who is considered normal either because he allows himself no excesses or because he has no need of them. The normal man is, by defin i tion, influ enced as much from within as from without. He consti tutes the extens ive middle group, on one side of which are those whose motiv a tions are determ ined mainly by the external object, and, on the other, those whose motiv a tions are determ ined from within. I call the first group extra ver ted, and the second group intro ver ted. The terms scarcely require elucid a tion as they explain them selves from what has already been said. Although there are doubt less indi vidu als whose type can be recog nized at
first glance, this is by no means always the case. As a rule, only careful observa tion and weigh ing of the evid ence permit a sure clas si fic a tion. However simple and clear the funda mental prin ciple of the two oppos ing atti tudes may be, in actual reality they are complic ated and hard to make out, because
than one indi vidual, despite the fact that in some ways it aptly char ac ter izes thou sands of others. Conformity is one side of a man, unique ness is the other. Classification does not explain the indi vidual psyche. Nevertheless, an under stand ing of psycho lo gical types opens the way to a better understand ing of human psycho logy in general. Type differ en ti ation often begins very early, so early that in some cases
one must speak of it as innate. The earli est sign of extra ver sion in a child is his quick adapt a tion to the envir on ment, and the extraordin ary atten tion he gives to objects and espe cially to the effect he has on them. Fear of objects is minimal; he lives and moves among them with confid ence. His appre hension is quick but impre cise. He appears to develop more rapidly than the intro ver ted child, since he is less reflect ive and usually without fear. He feels no barrier between himself and objects, and can there fore play with them freely and learn through them. He likes to carry his enter prises to the extreme and exposes himself to risks. Everything unknown is allur ing. To reverse the picture, one of the earli est signs of intro ver sion in a child
is a reflect ive, thought ful manner, marked shyness and even fear of unknown objects. Very early there appears a tend ency to assert himself over famil iar objects, and attempts are made to master them. Everything unknown is regarded with mistrust; outside influ ences are usually met with violent resist ance. The child wants his own way, and under no circum stances will he submit to an alien rule he cannot under stand. When he asks ques tions, it is not from curi os ity or a desire to create a sensa tion, but because he wants names, mean ings, explan a tions to give him subject ive protec tion against the object. I have seen an intro ver ted child who made his first attempts to walk only after he had learned the names of all the objects in the room he might touch. Thus very early in an intro ver ted child the char ac ter istic defens ive atti tude can be noted which the adult intro vert displays towards the object; just as in an extra ver ted child one can very early observe a marked assur ance and initi at ive, a happy trust ful ness in his deal ings with objects. This is indeed the basic feature of the extra ver ted atti tude: psychic life is, as it were, enacted outside the indi vidual in objects and object ive rela tion ships. In extreme cases there is even a sort of blind ness for his own indi vidu al ity. The introvert, on the contrary, always acts as though the object possessed a super ior power over him against which he has to defend himself. His real world is the inner one.
