ABSTRACT
Chapter 8 investigates the political dynamics surrounding the Blair government’s case for war. First, it considers the challenge ministers faced as they sought to balance their international-level commitment to supporting the Bush administration against the domestic-level imperative to demonstrate independence from the US line. Britain faced a classic ‘two-level game’ problem, in FPA terms. In the end, the government gambled on being able to reconcile the competing pressures it faced, and lost. Second, one way the Blair government tried to resolve its difficulties was by blaming France for its own failure to reach consensus at the Security Council. This was a rare example of a questionable pre-invasion claim that did not later damage the Blair government’s political support. France was not in fact responsible for the lack of agreement. But with the British press primed to look favourably on narratives based on French perfidy, the argument succeeded. Finally, the chapter considers the longer-term parliamentary politics of Iraq, including the impact of MPs’ new veto powers. Conservative support helped protect the Blair government from defeat in the 18 March House of Commons vote. From an FPA perspective, the role of opposition politicians directly affects both how effective public attitudes are in influencing decision-makers, and how far decision-makers can possibly face electoral punishment for their stance. The fact that Blair implied he would resign if defeated made a difference, too. He dared his MPs to decide between overthrowing their most successful leader ever, and overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Most chose to overthrow Saddam. It was a classic political disciplining measure, well known in the literature on legislative politics. And it worked.
