ABSTRACT
Major international developments from the late 1960s and during the 1970s prompted a reappraisal of Japan’s policy and role in Southeast Asia. In 1969, President Richard Nixon announced that the United States would reduce its military engagement in the region, expecting its allies to take primary responsibility for their own security. The 1973 oil shock and, a few months later, the outbreak of anti-Japan riots in Indonesia and Thailand made it imperative for Japan to rethink its policy and approach toward Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the reduced American involvement in the Vietnam War was followed, in 1975, by the fall of Saigon and the reunification of Vietnam. The new regional scenario was characterized by a communist Indochina side by side with non-communist ASEAN countries. In this context, a more confident Japan, a less involved United States, and the need to counter the spread of Soviet and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia prompted the Japanese to more proactively seek to influence the shaping of the emerging order in post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia. One outcome of this Japanese stance was the announcement in 1977 of the Fukuda Doctrine, which encompassed the guiding principles and objectives of Japan’s new Southeast Asia policy.
