ABSTRACT

The outbreak of the conflict in Cambodia – following the Vietnamese invasion of that country in December 1978 – and the heightening of Cold War tensions triggered by the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, deepened divisions in Southeast Asia and complicated Japan’s implementation of its newly launched Fukuda Doctrine. While making clear its support to the Western camp and to the position of the ASEAN countries on the Indochinese conflict, Japan sought to avoid the collapse of the Fukuda Doctrine by working to: 1) reduce the distance between Vietnam and ASEAN nations on the Cambodian problem; and 2) engage with Vietnam (to which Japan reluctantly had to suspend economic assistance after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia) to persuade it to withdraw from Cambodia and negotiate a peace settlement. Meanwhile, from the early stages of the conflict, the Japanese became involved in efforts to settle it and to tackle its destabilizing effects on the region.