ABSTRACT
During 1983 and 1984, Japan further strengthened its twin-track diplomatic line of officially endorsing Western criticism of Vietnam while, at the same time, striving to maintain an active diplomatic channel with Hanoi to persuade it to cooperate with ASEAN countries on the Cambodian problem and to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union. The Japanese invitation to the foreign minister of Soviet-backed Vietnam to visit Japan during a phase of heightened Cold War tension contrasted with the US policy of isolating Hanoi. At the same time, Japan showed increasing confidence as one of the actors involved in efforts to resume peace in Indochina: on the one hand, Foreign Minister Abe launched a three-point proposal to end warfare in Cambodia; on the other hand, Japan extended an invitation to Prince Sihanouk to visit Tokyo, in addition to the invitation to the Vietnamese foreign minister. These invitations were also to be viewed as “strategic” moves to strengthen Japan’s diplomatic role in peace efforts and, more generally, in the region.
