ABSTRACT
The 1981 destruction of a French-supplied and almost completed Iraqi nuclear reactor, usually known as Osiraq, offers in a single package a case that is simultaneously invaluable and incredibly prone to criticism. On the one hand, Osiraq is a rare case of deterrence failure in what was almost a nuclear dyad, allowing scholars to observe deterrence processes. Also, despite the characteristics of Israel’s democracy – whose military censor jealously guards disclosing certain national security issues, most prominently the existence of Israel’s nuclear arsenal – otherwise liberal policies, free press, and frequent leaks from the government make empirical evidence reasonably available. However, it must be admitted that the case has its downsides. Considering Iraq in 1981 a small nuclear state requires very relaxed criteria. Even accepting that, due to uncertainty at the latter stage of nuclear weapons development, progress is often impossible to determine for outsiders, making the difference between zero and a few essentially irrelevant, helps only a little. Yet the case still deserves examination. First, Iraq already had the means to retaliate, including SCUD missiles and 12 kg of French HEU, which some claim was enough for one bomb. Second, and even more importantly, there are striking similarities with the other cases, to be highlighted in the cross-case comparison.
