ABSTRACT
According to Chang and also Burr and Richelson, the President’s instruction to Harriman aimed at discussing the possibility of a joint political and, if necessary, military action. On the contrary, Freedman argues that the President himself had no specific idea in mind and was not really pressing for a military strike.18 What Kennedy really meant when putting the word “action” on paper is unclear.19 While both interpretations are plausible, putting a military option on the table appears more likely. In January 1963, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy informed the Director of Central Intelligence John McCone that Cuba and the Chinese nuclear program were the “two issues foremost in the minds of the highest authority and therefore should be treated accordingly by CIA.”20 By that time, the CIA had significantly extended its coverage of Chinese nuclear facilities by U.S. U-2s piloted by Taiwanese pilots and CORONA satellites, providing improved information including that necessary for military targeting. In February, Nitze requested the JCS study the options of how to persuade, pressure, or coerce the Chinese into signing the test ban treaty assuming the Soviet Union would join the U.S. action, or at least not interfere.21 Even though Nitze belongs to the few formative figures of the Cold War whose influence often exceeded their formal position, it is unlikely that he could have made such a request without some approval from his superiors. In response, the Joint Chiefs prepared a top-secret report on possible options to take out the Chinese nuclear program, exploring various actions, including diplomatic and military. Considering the military scenarios, the chiefs concluded that the United States: “has the capability of destroying either by conventional or nuclear air attack the identified CHICOM atomic energy facilities.”22 Yet it was also expected that both conventional and a limited nuclear strike would invite retaliation and escalation ranging from propaganda to direct military aggression against Asian countries allied to the West. The United States was believed to be able to counter any such military action initiated by the PRC, but probably they would have to resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the chiefs questioned Nitze’s
assumption about Soviet behavior and estimated that the Soviet Union would intervene on behalf of communist China in the case of more aggressive American actions. Soviet consent with the action, therefore, seemed to be a precondition for success. But as Harriman learned in Moscow, the Soviets were not interested in discussing anti-Chinese action. Khrushchev may not have been interested in discussing anti-Chinese action, yet it does not seem that he went in the opposite direction and threatened a hostile Soviet reaction to American action. Certainly Washington did not feel that way. Harriman informed Washington about his conversation with Khrushchev on July 27.23 A few days later, on July 31, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security William Bundy requested a “contingency plan for an attack with conventional weapons on Chinese Communist nuclear weapons production facilities designed to cause severest impact on and delay in the Chinese program.”24 On December 14, the JCS responded that conventional action was feasible, but they recommended considering tactical nuclear weapons for such an attack.25 The Chiefs also prepared the actual contingency plan that was marked Plan 94 and which provided “for overt operations employing U.S. forces in air strikes against a ChiCom nuclear production facility.”26
