ABSTRACT
We have seen that facts are established as such only in terms of a theory that constitutes them as facts in the first place. It is obvious, then, that it would be a circular exercise to judge the worth of a particular theory only in terms of the number of phenomena it picks out and constitutes as facts. On the other hand, however, there would seem to be something odd about calling a theory a good theory if it picked out no phenomena at all in the world. The worth of a theory may be regarded as indeterminate if it has not beet1, or cannot as yet be tested; but otherwise some evidential support is clearly necessary if a theory is to be kept 'on the books' for continued, and possibly favourable, consideration. These simple realisations are enough to it1dicate that, while the matter of 'supportive evidence' is a necessary consideration in the issue of evaluation of theories, it cannot be a sufficient consideration. We shall now proceed to indicate other factors that are, or might be, relevant in evaluating theories; and in doing so we shall also lay the ground for taking a whole new perspective with regard to considering the place and role of theory in describing, explaining and accounting for the world.
