ABSTRACT
In the last chapter I claimed that paternalism can be justified by reference to two notions - responsibility for the welfare of other members of the community and respect for persons. I argued that we could have no right to intervene in other people's personal decisions unless it were the case that we have some responsibility for their welfare, and although the existence of this responsibility could not be proved the consequences of assuming that it did not exist would generally be found unacceptable. At the same time I accepted that condoning the use of power by individuals or groups over others less powerful than themselves was potentially dangerous, and might reinforce inequalities of power and freedom. I argued that for the paternalism to be justified it must not only have been in the interests of the coerced but that the paternalist must respect the persons who were coerced as individuals with purposes of their own and as equals in importance if not in knowledge or experience. I said that there were no absolute criteria by which we could judge when paternalism was justified and no definitive list of the paternalistic behaviour consistent with respecting persons. However, I claimed that there were certain factors (such as the likelihood of subsequent consent, ignorance or lack of understanding of unperceived danger etc.) the presence of which would support a claim that paternalism was justified in a particular instance.
