ABSTRACT
Knowledge has something to do with the mind's own activities, and knowledge therefore has something to do with belief and judgment. That was the dear upshot of Plato's final refutation of the Secret Doctrine. But what exacdy is the connection between knowledge on the one hand and belief or judgment on the other? Not outright identity, if there can be false beliefs and judgments; for one cannot know anything false. Should knowledge then be identified, not with judgment in general, but with true judgment in particular? Theaetetus makes such a conjecture at Theaetetus 187 b 4-6. But if there can be no false judgment, then Theaetetus' eonjeeture would eome down to an outright identification of knowledge with judgment. And even if judgment is not the same as perception, the outright identification of knowledge with judgment would mean that we had advanced litde beyond the Secret Doetrine. Plato therefore investigares onee more how rhere can be false judgments. We are first presented wirh two arguments whieh purport to show that all judgments must be true; we are then presenred wirh three aeeounts to show how nevertheless so me judgments can be false.
