ABSTRACT
Ancient philosophy is different. You can read an awful lot of Plato and Aristotle without ever encountering any of our four Problems. But you cannot read far without encountering the twin prejudices that, to say the least, by and large our beliefs are true, and that falsehood is of necessity a rare and somewhat problematic occurrence. This is not to say that Plato and Aristotle uniformly succumbed to those prejudices; for on the contrary, Aristotle thinks error perfectly possible, and Plato thinks it widespread. Nor is this to deny that so me modern philosophers hold the view that falsehood is of necessity rare. The difference is that among modern philosophers that view is no mere prejudice, but the conc1usion of a long and sophisticated argument, an argument of the sort that they would not dream of giving for the conc1usion that some beliefs are false. 1 Plato by contrast devotes considerable philosophical skill and energy to showing that, and explaining how, we can make false statements and have false beliefs. Aristotle does not spend much time on this task; he is prepared to accept that Plato has done the job correctly. Nevertheless, Aristotle too provides an instructive contrast with the attitude of modern philosophers. For, as we will see, many of his most characteristic problems, doctrines and methods rely on ehe scarcely examined assumption that falsehood is rare.
