ABSTRACT
The main prescription for sustainable peace in current postwar societies is either institutional reconstruction or institutional reform with a major emphasis on the state and its agencies (Sisk 2013). The underlying assumption is that institutions provide mechanisms with which to manage confl icts without resorting to violence, support the accountability of state actors through rules, and sanction the illegitimate use of violence (e.g. Walter 2014). As external actors such as the United Nations or donors are important drivers of institutional reform in current postwar societies, there is much debate about the necessity to anchor institutions in local contexts in order to enhance their legitimacy (e.g. MacGinty and Richmond 2013). While this debate focuses on postwar reforms, we know little about the determinants and the eff ects of reform processes in the midst of war.1 Nevertheless, many countries introduce reforms in the midst of war, largely in the expectation that such measures will either de-escalate violence or have an impact on the outcome of their confl icts. Elections are a case in point, as many regimes seek to enhance their legitimation by holding (often fl awed) elections despite there being an ongoing war. The question is whether institutional reforms can reduce violence and pave the way towards the end of war or whether they simply promote path-dependent superfi cial changes.
