This chapter sketches the hazards incumbent upon insufficiently radical attempts to comprehend extreme aversive emotions, attempts that would in one way or another assimilate what author calling dread to mere' anxiety, or to fear. It simply sets out a possible mode for thinking of extreme aversive emotions, not attempting to prove that that mode is more fruitful than others. Philosophical illumination or perspicuity as to the nature of dread' often look to Kierkegaard or Heidegger. A possible exception being the late aphorism of Heidegger's that is the epigraph. It outlines how reading and understanding Wittgenstein can shed a somewhat distinctive light on extreme aversive emotions'; and can do so in a way that avoids the dubious theoretical commitments common to mainstream approaches in philosophy of the emotions, such as those of most Anglo-American Cognitive Science, and sometimes also those in the work of continental philosophers.