ABSTRACT
This chapter highlights a methodological shortcoming of some of the most influential legal theories and show that there is a need for an alternative way of theorizing about the law. There is little doubt that contemporary legal theory owes much to and has been greatly influenced by the philosophy of H. L. A. Hart. Perry is right in pointing out that a robust legal theory must provide an account of what makes widespread acceptance of norms stemming from a particular source obligatory. Awareness of the fallibility of one's a priori conclusions and the modesty of conceptual analysis requires devising ways of facilitating falsification. As various theories of legal pluralism have pointed out, it is this philosophical imperialism, the delusion that our thick and conclusive concept of law can be imported into different contexts. For Hartian positivists the point of legal theory is to map the world of legality, to picture it in an uncommitted, shallow way, to offer a neutral conceptual analysis.
