ABSTRACT
This chapter considers two arguments for the relativization of meaning and truth to language games: an argument from family resemblance and particularism and an argument which draws on scepticism about rule following. G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker claim that there is no rule scepticism in Wittgenstein, and that anyway rule scepticism is more unstable than other kinds of scepticism. D. Z. Phillips echoes Wittgenstein's aversion to generality in Wittgenstein and Religion: What Wittgenstein shows us in his remarks on religious belief is why there is good reason to note the different uses which belief and existence have, and to resist the craving for generality. Phillips claims that he would agree with R. Trigg that the existence of God is in no way dependent on our individual or collective thoughts of Him. In response to Alvin Plantinga's notion of defeasible trust in basic beliefs, Phillips writes disparagingly of trust in face of the possibility that all the epistemic practices are wrong.
