ABSTRACT
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) denied the CIA and FBI access to Baradar for weeks after his arrest, prompting doubts in both agencies about whether the Pakistanis had in fact turned over a new leaf. ISI held many of the cards necessary for an Afghan settlement, including a captive Taliban leadership and a capability to sustain and even enhance insurgent capabilities against coalition forces. US officials used the 'rogue' theory to explain Pakistani duplicity and give Islamabad a way of saving face; however, the Pakistanis publicly rejected any suggestion that they did not control ISI. The CIA Deputy Director, Stephen Kappes, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, were dispatched to Islamabad where they presented evidence of ISI involvement in the embassy bombing to Pakistani officials. The truth was that Headley worked for ISI and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), one of the most notorious Pakistan-backed terrorist groups.
