ABSTRACT
This book began with a discussion of some of the problems surrounding the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games. The Sochi Games were a ‘perfect storm’ of the worst outcomes of the Games, a monstrous mega-event that completely consumed an entire city, bringing problems such as forced labour used to construct Games infrastructure, displacement and forced eviction of families to make way for the Games, and environmental damage caused by the construction. To add insult to injury, most of the positive legacies promised, such as increased tourism, did not come to fruition, while negative legacies, such as ‘white elephants’, which will cost the state billions of dollars in ongoing costs, are rampant (Müller 2015). Although those who were harmed by the Games should have been protected by the Russian state, the state was unable to assist, or was complicit in causing these harms. As this book is being written in the lead-up to the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio, given the stories of displacement of people from the favelas, and the economic problems suffered by Rio (and Brazil) in the wake of a slowing economy and political crisis, it seems like the outcome may not be all that different from Sochi. The Sochi Games were also an example of the problems faced by global governance institutions, and those who find themselves affected by the decisions of these institutions. The IOC’s decision to select Sochi as the host of the Olympic Games was likely made without much local input, but greatly harmed the people of Sochi, as well as those who came to Sochi to
work. Ultimately, it was not the IOC, but agents of the IOC, or the Russian state, that carried out the actions that cased the harms mentioned. The Sochi Games laid bare the unaccountability of those who organised the Olympic Games to the IOC, and the unaccountability of the IOC to anybody for the conduct of the Olympic Games. These problems are core problems that global governance and global administrative law scholars are attempting to understand and address. This book considered the problems of global governance through a legal perspective, namely global administrative law, as well as a political science perspective of legitimacy (which is also a concern of legal scholars). Ultimately, if global governance institutions want those who they govern to comply with their rules and regulations over a long-term horizon, the institution must be perceived as legitimate. Legitimacy is bestowed upon the institution by actors that are regulated, but also other actors in the international system, such as states, peer institutions, and individuals who may be affected by the decisions of the institution. Three particular types of legitimacy were examined: structural legitimacy, substantive legitimacy, and procedural legitimacy. The IOC was found to have a moderate degree of structural legitimacy, with some shortcomings. The IOC is a private NGO and, as such, lacks democratic legitimacy. In particular, the IOC Session, with its maximum of 115 members, co-opted by the IOC, with no states representatives, hampers the IOC’s claims to legitimacy. However, this is not fatal. The IOC possesses almost unimpeachable subject-matter expertise in the regulation of sport, especially in regards to the Olympic Games, and has made efforts to become more representative, particularly of athletes. The IOC is also independent from states and other actors, although perhaps too independent as the IOC is often seen as unaccountable to anyone. In regards to organising the Olympic Games, the IOC co-opts domestic authorities, including the state, into providing financial and legislative support for the Games, reducing the risk borne by the organisers of the event (Jennings 2012). However, this situation creates a ‘problem of many hands’ where various actors are involved in the Olympic Games, and ultimate accountability for problems arising from the Games is difficult to trace. A lack of substantive legitimacy is perhaps the largest problem the IOC and the Olympic Games face. The Olympic Games, in a number of editions, do not adhere to their minimum moral responsibility (i.e. do not violate human rights), and do not possess institutional integrity (i.e. fulfil expectations). Recent editions of the Games have seen violations of the labour rights of those who work on the infrastructure for the Games, evictions of individuals from their homes to make way for Games venues and supporting infrastructure (transport, hotels, etc.), and damage to the environment, amongst other problems, in violation of international standards. These outcomes are evidence of the IOC and the Olympic Games
failing to meet their minimum moral responsibility. These problems are followed up by empty promises of socio-economic benefits, such as urban revitalisation and job creation, which often fail to materialise. The IOC and bid committees tout these benefits as reasons to host the Games. However, the way the Games are currently organised are unsustainable, and do not meet the mandate set out by the IOC, leading to a shortfall in institutional integrity. These problems, which I have termed the ‘worst outcomes’ of hosting the Games, are exacerbated when the Games are held in emerging market economies, in which sporting events increasingly are being held. These states often have weak accountability regimes, leaving individuals who are harmed by the Games unlikely to receive protection and redress. With these problems known, the procedures that the IOC uses to select their hosts were questioned for their procedural legitimacy. Decisionmaking processes should be rational, consistent, and impartial. They should also have appropriate accountability mechanisms in place to foster transparency and public participation in decision-making, and allow for review (judicial or otherwise). The host selection process for the Olympic Games is an effective decision-making process for the IOC to use. The only major shortfall is a lack of public participation in the bids submitted to host the Olympic Games. As bids to host the Olympics are often spearheaded by political and business elites, the possibility that an Olympic Games is bid on by, and hosted in, a city without public participation is significant. The host selection process does not necessarily require a review mechanism, without claims of corruption or dishonest behaviour. As the host selection process cannot anticipate or prevent every problem, the relationship between the IOC and the actors who organise the Games was examined. A principal-agent relationship was established with the IOC as the ‘principal’, and the host country’s National Olympic Committee (NOC), the Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG), and host city as the ‘agents’. The agents oversee, or participate directly in, some of the worst outcomes of the Games, which are not in the interest of the IOC. However, the IOC acts as a weak principal, with overly-flexible mandates through the host selection process and the Host City Contract, and limited oversight. Additionally, while the IOC can impose consequences on the agents, the only formal consequence provided for is the removal of the Games. However, the removal of the Games is costly not only to the agents, but to the IOC as well, undermining the credibility of the consequence. As such, the IOC needs to reconsider its relationship with its agents, and the mechanisms it uses to ensure that the agents carry out the Games to its satisfaction, including ensuring that the ‘worst outcomes’ do not materialise. Given the IOC’s status as the rights-holder of the Games, and as the principal to those who organise the Games, the lack of accountability of
the IOC to external parties is troublesome. Namely, there is no accountability when the IOC is unwilling or unable to ensure that its agents adhere to its mandate. In examining how that problem might be addressed, I compared the IOC to the World Bank. The World Bank’s accountability crisis of the 1980s bears a strong resemblance to the IOC’s current problems, as World Bank projects resulted in displacement of persons, and environmental damage, while also not fulfilling the mandate of promoting economic and social development. The World Bank engaged in a series of reforms, most notably the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP), a complaint mechanism that could investigate Bank projects at the request of those who were affected by the projects. A similar body, with more independence, would likely be of great value to the Olympic Movement and the Olympic Games, and allow those who are harmed by the Games to request the IOC to step in to ensure that the Games are conducted in a truly sustainable manner.
