ABSTRACT
The British deployment to Afghanistan accelerated as the full disaster of Iraq blazed on in high relief. Intelligence played a role in the British deployment but it was not crucial. Better intelligence would not realistically have tipped the conflict in the favour of the British. The British also lacked reliable local Afghan security partners and the intelligence that might bring. Indeed, as in Iraq the British lost the intelligence 'war' in that they couldn't dismantle Taliban shadow government or combat its mesh of informers. Better intelligence would have allowed the limited UK forces to bring their firepower to bear more effectively and hammer the Taliban in a more sustained assertive fashion particularly in the early stages of the deployment. After the fall of Kabul AQ retreated to Jalalabad and 'coalition signals and human intelligence suggested that significant numbers of al-Qaeda fighters and possible high-value targets were moving from Jalalabad to take refuge in Tora Bora'.
