ABSTRACT
This chapter demonstrates that certain refugees can at times deploy their Palestinian identity to extract rents, a practice which arises from specific beliefs about entitlements. It describes that this sense of entitlement can at times lead to moral hazards in the camps, as was demonstrated in the behaviour of residents in obstructing a public works project in Shatila. The chapter explores the case study to demonstrate that moral hazards do arise from resident's sense of entitlement to United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) resources. The arguments Arab countries put forward for Palestinian exceptionalism essentially posed that the refugee problem was an outcome and therefore the responsibility of the international community's decision to endorse the partition plan for Palestine, precipitating a somewhat predictable crisis. Moral hazard highlights the propensity of people to behave parasitically when the ratio of risk to reward is altered through the provision of some type of welfare assurance or subsidy.
